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American involvement in the Vietnam War was accelerated in the years 
1966 to 1968 and this involvement generated public protests and concern. 
This thesis reviews the editorial attitudes of the Washington Post and the 
New York Times toward the war for 1968, which is considered to be a turning 
point in the war. Reviews and reports by the Times and Post were indi-
cators of American public opinion. 
The author chose to analyze the editorials of the Times and Post 
because of personal and professional biases. The Times has long been the 
nation's most prestigious newspaper, as well as a major influence on other 
media. The Post was chosen because of its vanguard role in the nation's 
capital. Both are to be lauded for their prolific coverage and their 
positions over varying degrees of the political spectrum. For example, 
both the Times and the Post were among ten daily newspapers classified as 
the "most superior newspapers for news coverage, integrity, and service" 
(Rivers, 1975, p. 37). 'Also, the Times' and Post's microfilms were readily 
available in the Iowa State University Library. 
In 1968, American public opinion was to undergo sharp and unsettling 
changes in its attitudes toward national leadership and trust in the 
American government. This study endeavors to gain some perspective of 
these diverse reactions, by exploring and analyzing the editorial content 
of the New York Times and the Washington Post. 
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Background Information 
Vietnam is situated along the southeastern tip of Asia on the South 
China Sea, and is approximately 127,30'0' square miles, or the size of 
Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina combined, with a population 
of 5.3 million people. Ninety percent of the population are ethnic 
Vietnamese, and the other ten percent are ethnic minorities--Chinese, 
Muong, Thai, Khmer, Cham, Montagnards, Meo, and Man (U.S. Department'of 
State, 1981). 
Vietnam has a history of political turmoil perpetuated by foreign 
interference and internal power struggles. For more than 1,0'0'0' years 
(111 B.C.-939 A.D.) the Vietnamese contended with Chinese occupancy and 
oppression. In the 17th century, Vietnam split into two hostile states 
(establishing the demarcation lines which at the 1954 Geneva Conference 
came to be known as the Demilitarized Zone). By the 18th century, the 
two states had reunited. But by no means was this the end to the Viet-
namese plight (U.S .. Department of State, 1981). 
In 1858, France had begun to move into Vietnam; by 1884, she had 
gained complete control of the country. Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Indo-
chinese Communist Party, in 1930', led the first significant armed 
uprising against the French. However, the French moved quickly to 
repress the efforts of the Communists and the Nationalists. Many 
_ insurgents went underground, fled to China, were imprisoned or executed 
U.S. Department of State, 1981). 
During this period of uprising, Ho had been captured and imprisoned 
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in Hong Kong by the British. However, upon his release in 1933, he 
returned to China to form the Viet Minh--a united Communist front move-
ment whose aim was to unite Vietnamese of all classes. orOUDS and 
nationalist parties to defeat the Japanese and French. By 1940, Japanese 
troops had begun movement into northern Vietnam as a part of their plan to 
conquer Southeast Asia; by 1941, they had successfully infiltrated 
southern Vietnam, and remained there until 1945 (U.S. Department of 
State, 1981). 
In August, 1945, Ho led a successful uprising against the French. 
His forces were able to gain control of much of rural Vietnam. On July 
20, 1954, France signed the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in 
Vietnam, ending the 18-year war and French colonial rule in Indochina 
(U.S. Department of State, 1981). 
Provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreement included: the division of 
the country at the 17th parallel into two military zones; a cease-fire; 
a 300-day period for free movement of the population between the two 
zones; and the establishment of an International Control Commission to 
supervise its execution (U.S. Department of State, 1981). 
Following the partition, the South experienced initial periods of 
economic and political pains. Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, however, 
was soon able to make progress that led to significant developments in 
South Vietnam, and caused concern in the North, where the Hanoi leaders 
were waiting for the South's demise. 
In the late 19505, the North reactivated the network of Comm·unists 
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who had stayed in the South (the Vietcong). Cadres of trained guerrillas 
infiltrated the South, practicing terrorism. In 1964, Hanoi ordered 
regular units of the North Vietnamese Army into South Vietnam. In 1961, 
Diem had sought United States assistance and military advisers were sent 
to help the government. By November 1963, when President Kennedy was 
assassinated, there were 16,300 American soldiers in South Vietnam. In 
1965, Marine units were dispatched in the Danang area (U.S. Department of 
State, 1981). A period of peace talks and secret negotiations were to be 
followed by the withdrawal of U.S. troops, which had begun in 1969; and 
the implementation of a cease-fire agreement, which was signed on 
January 23, 1973. 
By 1972, only air and sea supports "'/ere left in South Vietnam. Hanoi, 
however, continued its subversive activity in the South--sending in tens 
of thousands of North Vietnamese troops to join the 160,000 already there. 
By 1975, the Communist regimes had begun a major offensive in the South, 
which eventually led to the fall of Saigon and the G.V.N. Thousands of 
Vietnamese, fearing Communist rule, fled the country. The Vietnamese 
struggle and this exodus continues today (U.S. Department of State, 1981). 
To many, Arllerican involvement in the Vietnam Har was tragic in its 
consequences. Gallucci (1975, p. 1) wrote: 
liThe country I s predi cament seemed to be the result of 
ignorance, mispreception, and misunderstanding, all of which 
in time contributed to an ill-founded and ill-fated optimism 
on the part of the leaders and their admirers." 
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In 1964, the year before the U.S. became actively involved in the 
Vietnam War, the national mood was described as one of IIpalmy optimism" 
(Millett, 1978, p. 5). President Johnson's actions and his capabilities 
as a national leader were highly rated by the American public. Fifty-two 
percent of the American public responded favorably to the opinion poll's 
question on how he was handling the American foreign policy towards 
Vietnam (Gallup, October, 1969). 
Integration and civil rights were the burning issues in the media, 
as well as on the agenda of national social concerns (Gallup, June, 1964, 
p. 1883). The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 boosted Johnson's 
popularity at home. His visions of a IIGreat Society" instilled great 
pride in Americans, and the hope that their needs would be fulfilled 
(Millett, 1978, p. 5). 
In the year American went to war, the economy of the nation was 
buoyant. The Gross National Product, as a consequence of Johnson's tax 
measures, expanded tremendously. Inflation had been curbed to an annual 
growth of less than two percent (Millett, 1978, p. 5). High cost of 
living and unemployment were the least of Americans' concerns. According 
to the Gallup polls (October, 1969, p. 1944), as an item on the list of 
IIMost Important Problem ll facing the country, the cost of living received 
four percent of mentions, and unemployment, only t.hree percent. 
The White House had waged a full-scale campaign on reform and 
revolution. There were programs to reduce the level of poverty; health 
programs to combat disease; rigid laws against discrimination; and 
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educational programs to eradicate ignorance. It was a period of concerted 
participation in presidential activism, and faith in national leadership 
and the efficacy of government programs. But, the Vietnam War was to 
cast an impregnable shadow on this period of prosperity (Millett, 1978, 
p. 5). 
In May, 1964, sixty-three percent of the American populace gave 
little or no attention to the developments in South Vietnam (Gallup, 
1969, p. 1882). By mid-1967, the poll indicated that half of American 
voters still had no clear idea of what the war in Vietnam was all about 
(Millett, 1978, p. 7). 
Then, in January and February of 1968, the Tet offensive occurred. 
This event was to be covered extensively by the mass media, especially 
television, and brought the reality of the war to the American people. 
According to Gallup, the Tet represented the turning point in opinions 
toward the war in the U.S. A poll taken immediately following the event, 
found that for the first time since America had become involved, sub-
stantially more people said the war was a mistake than said it was not 
(Millett, 1978, p. 4). 
Furthermore, confronted with the disparity between the depth of the 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the shallowness of their own knowledge 
of that small, insignificant, isolated area in Southeast Asia, Americans 
found themselves called upon to support what has come to be known now as 
America's longest war (Herring, 1979, p. x). 
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According to Gallucci (1975), there have been conventional expla-
nations about how the war in Vietnam happened, and how America bec~me 
involved. One such convention ;s that America "slipped" into the Vietnam 
War, or perhaps more accurately wrote Gallucci, that it had "sunk" into 
Vietnam over a period of time. The United States' role was projected as 
that of a nation trying to protect a small alien country from Communist 
aggression. And, although aid was given, Americans had the notion that 
America would extricate itself from involvement as soon as 'it could be 
done reasonably and lIin a good political practical fashion" (Gallucci, 
1975, p. 3). 
Americans were led to believe that the U.S. was "seduced" into the 
war; and many saw America as the "victim." This interpretation, however, 
was rejected by Leslie H. Gelb and Daniel Ellsberg. They maintain that 
the U.S. neither slipped nor sunk into Vietnam; it was not seduced; and 
nor did it find itself deeply involved because it miscalculated or mis-
judged the chances of success. Rather, these authors argue that the 
comfortable image of "Proerica-as-victim" in Southeast Asia serves to 
excuse our activity in Vietnam as a mistake "committed by well-meaning but 
ignorant policy makers" (Gallucci, 1975, p. 3). Gallucci espouses Gelb's 
ideas. He refers to Gelb's article, "Where Do We Go From Here": 
"If Viet-Nam were a story of how the system failed, that 
is, if our leaders did not do what they wanted to do or if they 
did not realize what they were doing or what was happening it 
would be easy to package a large and assorted box of policy-
making panaceas. For example: fix the method of reporting 
from the field. Fix the way progress is measured in a guerrilla 
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war. Make sure the President sees all the alternatives. But 
these are all third-order issues, because the U.S. politica1-
bureaucratic system did not fail, it worked." 
On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh stood in festive celebration in 
Hanoi and proclaimed this day Independence Day for Vietnam against 
French rule. American warplanes flew over the city, U.S. Army officers 
stood on the reviewing stand with Ho and other leaders, and a Vietnamese 
band played the "Star-Spangled Banner." Ho spoke of Vietnam's "particu1ar 
intimate relations" with the U.S. (Herring, 1979, p. 1). 
This was the beginning of a succession of bitter ironies. Despite 
the outward appearance of goodwill and friendship, the U.S. had not always 
supported Ho in his efforts, as has already been indicated. From 1950 
to 1954, the U.S. acquiesced to the return of France to Vietnam--
actively supporting France's efforts to suppress Ho's revolution. 
The inconsistencies in American policy regarding foreign affairs are 
well-documented. Up until 1945, President Roosevelt supported the 
Indochinese independence. However, he retreated on his stand, and 
endorsed, instead, a proposal under which the colonies would be placed 
in trusteeship only with the approval of the mother country. This was 
done so as not to antagonize France (Herring, 1979. D. 6). 
However, after Roosevelt's death, Harry Truman cared even less about 
Indochinese interests and colonization. His top priority was in 
promoting stable and friendly governments in Western Europe that could 
stand as bulwarks against Russian expansion. The Truman Administration 
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concluded that the U.S. "had no interest" in "championing schemes of 
international trusteeship" that would weaken and alienate the "European 
states whose help we need to balance Soviet power in Europe" (Herring, 
1979, PD. 5-6). 
By 1947, the U.S. had formally committed itself to the containment 
of Soviet expansion in Europe. The Truman Administration had become 
increasingly obsessed with Communist expansion in Europe. The next two 
years American attention was riveted on France, where economic stagnation 
and political instability aroused grave fears of a possible Communist 
takeover. Thus, for the time being, the destiny of Indochina was left 
solely in the hands of France. The State Department concluded: 
"An immediate and vital interest in keeping in power a friendly 
government to assist in the furtherance of our aims in Europe, 
must take precedence over active steps looking toward the 
realization of our objectives in Indochina" (Herring, 1979, p. 7). 
During the fir'st three years of the Indochina War, the U.S. maintained 
a fi nn pro-French "neutra 1 ity" pol icy. Reluctant to place itself in the 
awkward position of directly supporting colonialism, the Truman Adminis-
tration rejected all of France's appeals for military aid to be used 
against the Viet Minh. But, at the same time American funds were being 
provided under the Marshall Act, which allowed France to use its own 
resources to prosecute the war in Indochina. The U.S. was also cautious 
in assisting the Viet Minh even indirectly. The White House refused to 
acknowledge receipt of Ho's requests for support, and declined to use its 
leverage to end the fighting or bring about a negotiated settlement 
(Herring, 1979, p. 8). 
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There have been various reasons given as to why the U.S. deemed it 
necessary to forget its cOOJnitment of "neutrality" and become involved in 
Vietnam in the early 1950s. Following are the arguments that Herring 
puts forward. 
First, support for France in Indochina was considered essential for 
the security of Western Europe. France's economic recovery and political 
stability had been retarded by massive expenditures in its war against 
the Viet Minh. U.S. policy makers, more certain than ever of a Soviet 
threat, began to formulate plans in early 1950 to raise the forces neces-
sary to defend Europe against the Red Army. The initial proposal required 
France to contribute sizeable numbers of troops and provided for the 
rearmament of West Germany. France was already resistant to this measure, 
and the U.S. feared that if it did not respond positively to its ally's 
appeal for aid in Indochina, then France might refuse to cooperate with 
its strategic design for Western Europe (Herring, 1979, p. 10). 
Secondly, the fall of China prompted American strategists to conclude 
that Southeast Asia was vital to the security of the U.S. The Communist 
triumphs had already aroused nervousness in Europe, and the U.S. feared 
that another major victory might tempt Europe to reach an accoomodation 
with the Soviets. 
Economically, the consequences would be equally profound. The U.S. 
and its European allies would be denied access to important markets. 
Southeast Asia was the world's largest producer of natural rubber. It 
was also an important source of oil, tungsten, tin, and other strategic 
commodities. 
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Policy makers also feared that the loss of Southeast Asia would 
permanently damage the nation's strategic position in the Far East. 
America's first line of defense in the Pacific--the off-shore island 
chain extending from Japan to the Philippines--would be endangered. Air 
and sea routes between Australia and the Middle East and the U.S. and 
India could be cut off, severely hampering military operations in the 
event of a war. Such a step would leave Japan, India and Australia 
vulnerable, and would cut them off from each other. Even more disastrous, 
denied access to the raw materials, rice and markets upon which their 
economy depended, the U.S. believed that the Japanese might see no 
choice but to come to terms with the enemy (Herrinq. 1979. D. 11). 
Finally, American policy makers had firmly embraced the concept 
of the "domino theory", the belief that the fall of Indochina would bring 
about the rapid collapse of other nations in Southeast Asia. Thus, these 
factors ended American neutrality and produced a commitment to furnish 
France military and economic assistance for the war against the Viet 
Minh (Herring, 1979. p. 12). 
The Tet Offensive 
According to Newsweek, the roots of the Tet Offensive started in 
the spring of 1967. The leaders of North Vietnam, alarmed at the 
devastating losses of Communist ranks in the south, re-examined their 
long-standing strategy of waging a protracted war of attrition from 
rural base areas, and decided that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces 
couldn't hold out against the U.S. and its allies much longer. Newsweek 
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claimed this information was obtained from confiscated enemy documents 
and transcripts (Newsweek, March, 1968, p. 64). 
Subsequently, a group of Politburo members in North Vietnam led by 
Marxist theoretician TruongChinh, drafted new plans. In March or April 
1967, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong (Communist) Party passed 
"Resolution 13" which called for a new strategy to achieve victory "in 
the shortest possible time." 
It is thought that Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap played 
a major role in the offensive. His tactics entailed a three-phased 
campaign beginning in the fall of 1967 with attacks along South Vietnam's 
border. The intent was to tie down large numbers of U.S. troops. By 
the spring of 1968, political cadres were to set off a general uprising 
among the populace. His major goal was to wage decisive battles against 
the U.S. in the western highlands and at the U.S. Marine outpost 
installation at Khe Sanh (Newsweek, p. 64). 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, on New Year's Eve of 1968, 
remarked that peace talks would definitely start once the U.S. stopped 
bombing North Vietnam. It is believed that Trinh was also aware of 
Giap's plans, and some U.S. officials believed that his "peace offer" 
was simply devised to elicit a bombing halt during the critically 
important days prior to the Tet attack. 
Situated along the southern panhandle of North Vietnam, not far 
from the Khe Sanh base, 240,000 Communist troops awaited for orders from 
Giap. The command for attack was read over Radio Hanoi by President 
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Ho Chi Minh, who recited this poem: IlThis spring shines far brighter 
than before. Happy news of victories blooms across the land. South and 
North challenge each other to fight the U.S. aggressors. Forward! 
Total victory will be ours.1I 
The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) selected Major General 
Tran Do to coordinate the offensive against Saigon. Tran Do divided 
the Saigon area into five subsectors. The center was the Presidential 
Palace. Also divided were the suburbs where secret guerrilia cells were 
ready to provide guides, shelter and food to the troops. Communist 
troops were placed 30 miles away from Saigon in an effort to lure allied 
troops away from the ,capital (Newsweek, 1968, p. 65). 
However, South Vietnamese Army headquarters didn't take the threat 
seriously or refused to believe Saigon was the target. Thus, when the 
attack began, the nearest U.S. unit was 38 miles away from Saigon near 
the Hoc Mon bridge. Viet Cong troops penetrated the U.S. Embassy compound 
in Saigon, seized control of much of the imperial citadel of Hue, and 
terrorized 26 provincial capitals from the Demilitarized Zone in the 
north to the Mekong Delta. 
The Tet Offensive was far from a failure. By catching the U.S. and 
South Vietnamese forces by surprise, it made a mockery of numerous 
allied claims that the enemy was too weak to fight. It forced thousands 
of allied troops to withdraw to the defense of the cities, and left 
the South Vietnamese countryside vulnerable to Communist encroachment. 
Furthermore, by launching their Tet Offensive, the Communists seized the 
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battlefield initiative from half a million U.S. troops and raised doubt 
in the minds of millions of Americans about the future of the Vietnam 
War. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Hith new developments in the technique and the application of the 
content analysis as a research tool, a diversity of definitions have been 
used in describing this method. In early analysis, Berelson (1952, 
p. 16) defines content analysis as a method for objective, systematic, 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of a text. Later, 
Holsti (1969, p. 143) modified this definition, stipulating that the 
content analysis must not only be objective and systematic in its 
approach, but that it must include a general description of the manifest 
content of a text as well. 
Nevertheless, despite the diversity in definitions, the general 
consensus is that content analysis allows a researcher to view messages 
in a systematic, objective, general and quantitative manner. Objectivity 
requires that each step in the research process be based on explicitly 
formulated rules and procedures. The content analysis must be systematic 
in its inclusion and exclusion of categories in following consistently 
applied rules. ·Holsti regards the principle of generality important, in 
that it provides theoretical relevance to the analysis. Quantitativeness 
is usually strictly defined, but is often used in a vague manner (George, 
1959; Rosengren, 1981, p. 11). 
There has been much disagreement between early researchers and 
their contemporaries about the applicability of content analyses. For 
instance, Berelson (p. 16), among others, supports the view that the 
content analysis deals with '~hat-is-said" and not "why-the-content-is-
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1ike-that.1I More recent researchers, like Budd, et a1. (1967, p. 54), 
disagree with Berelson's method because his approach leaves unanswered 
the question of the implications of what was said compared to what was 
not said (Gitau, 1979, p. 42). This researcher prefers the earlier 
approach, but does not overlook the contributions made by Budd and others. 
Bryder cited Kaplan's view, which is also worth considering (1981, p. 73): 
IIIt is less important to draw a fine line between what is 
'scientific' and what is not than cherish every opportunity 
for scientific growth .... 11 
However, it is not the intent of this research to argue the merits of 
the content analysis (or its authors), but only to say that it does have 
a legitimate place in research. 
One final definition of content analysis is that it involves a care-
ful scrutiny of the written materials in a communication, so that the 
investigator may be able to make judgement based on the original infor-
mation conveyed in the communication process (Gitau, p. 42). 
The need for information, in today's society, can never be over-
emphasized. The increasing complexity of world affairs, government and 
public affairs, etc., demands that the public be informed, and have access 
to free and diverse expressions. Such is the interest of much of the 
public in the editorial page. Editorials are considered as vital sources 
of information by the consumers of this medium. Inasmuch as the edi-
torial is an expression of public opinion on various issues of public 
concern, it is safe to say that editorials may either modify or 
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directly influence the opinions in a free society. 
According to Lasswell (1966, p. 189), there is a manifest interplay 
between the media and the community they serve. He stated that the 
media which serve a community will: 1) transmit the viewpoints of its 
members on important issues to the entire community; 2) disclose any 
threat against the community; and 3) attempt to respond to the threat in 
its editorial content. 
Merrill (1968, pp. 30-31) further commented on the functions of the 
"f-ree el ite" newspapers. He attributes their importance to their 
1) independence, financial stability, integrity, social concern, good 
writing and editing; 2) strong opiniQnand interpretative emphasis, world 
consciousness, nonsensationalism in articles and make up; 3) emphasis on 
politics, international relatisns, economics, social welfare, cultural 
endeavors, education and science; 4Ldetermination to serve and help to 
expand a well-educated, intellectual readership at home and abroad; and 
5) desire to appeal to and influence opinion leaders everywhere. 
The communication and informational functions of the media, no doubt, 
influenced the feelings and opinions of the mass audience regarding the 
Vietnam War. Various public opinion studies have supported the claim that 
editorials do tend to influence public opinion. 
Bird and Merwin (1951, p. 330) suggested that the editorial "is a 
most important part of the relationship between the press and the public." 
Other scholars, as well, have stated that editorials shape, guide, and 
influence public opinion (Lewis, 1949; Waldrop, 1955; McCombs, 1967). 
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Furthermore, it has been established that editorials can even bring about 
opinion change (Brinkman, 1968), as well as stimulate public debate and 
discussion on important issues (Davis and Rarick, 1964). 
Vietnam is such a recent happening, that to date, not much communi-
cation research has been done on newspaper coverage of the war. Murphy 
(1979), however, analyzed the editorial opinion of the Atlanta Daily 
World, Atlanta Constitution, Chicago Defender, and Chicago Tribune for 
periods covering July 27 to August 9, 1964; January 1 to January 15, 1966; 
January 24 to February 8, 1968; an~ December 17 to December 31,1970. 
In her study, Murphy concluded that 1) the editorial opinion in the 
sample of Black and white daily newspapers did not reflect Black public 
opinion toward the war; 2) the social, economic and political factors 
did not affect the nature or pattern of the editorial on the war; and 
3) that the sample of Black and white daily newspapers had the same, 
rather than different editorial opinion toward the war during the same 
time frame. 
In another study, Stephen Elias (1978) conducted a computer-aided 
analysis (SPSS) of the editorial content of five American newspapers. 
Using the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, Chicago 
Tribune, and the Washington Post, this author studied the period of this 
country's most active involvement in Vietnam, 1964-1975. 
Using quantitative analysis, the study traced and examined editorial 
trends as they developed from generally pro-war opinion at the time of 
the Tonkin Gulf incident (1964) to almost universally anti-war opinion 
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when Saigon fell in 1975. The events examined were the 1) Tonkin Gulf 
incident, 2) 1968 Tet Offensive, 3) Nixon's 1969 Vietnamization and, 
4) the Fall of Saigon. 
Elias found that the New York Times showed the least amount of 
change, falling consistently in the anti-war category throughout the 
1964-1975 period. The Post, with the exception of a skewed effect 
regarding the Tet Offensive, steadily increased its anti-war position. 
Just as steadily, it decreased its pro-war items throughout the time 
period studied. The Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times and the Post 
trended from pro-war to anti-war positions during the same time frame. 
The Wall Street Journal trended from anti-war to pro-war. 
The overall tone of the editorials was anti-war. Elias concluded 
that each paper was willing to make a definite stand during the period 
under study. The paper which most clearly appeared to have changed its 
editorial opinion was the Los Angeles Times. 
Also, Elias found that both the Post and the New York Times presented 
fewer items on the Tet Offensive than the other papers. In their 
editorials on February 1, 1968, both newspapers seem to suggest that the 
offensive was a final Communist attempt prior to beginning peace 
negotiations. 
The New York Times, in its anti-war tone, referred to the offensive 
as "further proof of the limitations of American power in Asia" ("B10ody 
Path To Peace", p. 36). It further stated that the offensive could not 
be the work of an enemy force whose morale is "sinking fast;" that the 
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u.s. could hardly be said to be IIwinning,1I and that substantially II more 
troopsll than the Admini stration had yet admitted IIwoul d be 
required ll in order to attain a IIcl ear cut military victory.1I 
The Postls first editorial was equally as critical. It warned that 
the Administrationl~ talk of an invasion in the context of the·Viet 
Cong attack was dangerous. It stated that American military officials 
IIhad best be thinking of a different emphasis ll in their actions than 
simply lIattrition of enemy forces in the hinterlands;1I and ·offered that 
possibly lIa modified, more selective search-and-destroy polici' was 
needed (IiRationalizing the Vietnam Rampagell , p. A20). The Post 
concluded that its suggested alternatives had IIbeen advanced publ icly ..• 
by responsibl e menll but were unl i kely to get a full hearing whil e we lI are 
determined to find enemy failures in actions where the enemy, by its own 
known definition of its objectives, finds success. 1I 
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METHODOLOGY 
The basic objective of this study centered around the examination 
of attitudes as expressed in editorials toward the Vietnam War before the 
1968 Tet Offensive, and immediately after it. The two major newspapers 
selected were the Washington Post and the New York Times. The original 
intention was to examine a much longer time period. However, time being 
a factor, the scope of the study was narrowed to include the entire year 
of 1968 only, thus placing greater emphasis on the coverage of this 
particular event. 
Several researchers have provided definitions of content analysis. 
However, this researcher considered Berelson's definition to be adequate. 
He stated that "Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication" (1952, p. 16). 
The 1968 Tet Offensive is considered the turning point of the Vietnam 
War. As casualties and the sense of futility went up, support at home 
went down. This year is also significant in history, because on March 31, 
President Johnson ordered all bombing stopped on North Vietnam. He also 
announced that he would not seek re-election. 
The criteria for selection of these newspapers were personal as 
well as professional. Both of these newspapers have long been recognized 
for their thorough coverage of international affairs and their willing-
ness to take editorial positions. Both the Post and the Times were listed 
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among the 10 daily newspapers classified as having the IImost superior 
news coverage, integrity, and service. 1I In addition, the Times and 
Post's microfilms were readily available in the ISU Library. 
The New York Times' Index was utilized to extract all editorials 
covering the Vietnam War for 1968. Because the Washington Post did not 
establish an index until 1970, the researcher had to scan each editorial 
in each edition of the Post for this period. 
In order to establish a workable base of data from which to analyze 
reactions of the newspapers' editorials, this study is based on 201 
editorials. A total of nine variables were utilized in a coding sheet 
to evaluate each editorial involved in the study (see Appendix B). The 
variables concerned such items as: 1) newspaper's name, 2) page number, 
3) date of editorial, 4) title of editorial, 5) content categories, 
6) placement of editorial, 7) direction of editorial, 8) theme or overall 
tone of editorial, and 9) number of column inches. The use of themes to 
determine the overall tone was considered necessary in order to more 
objectively evaluate each editorial's content. The most significant 
criterion in the determination of the parameters of a theme was the 
ability to infer a 'definitive tonal meaning from it. This criterion was 
also used in evaluating the content. 
Establishing a rigid system of categories seems to be the problem 
most associated with content analysis. The researcher was guided by the 
fact that the categories should: 1) reflect the purpose of this research, 
2) be equally relevant during the entire period, 3) be comprehensive, and 
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4) be mutually exclusive. Following these percepts of category con-
struction, the researcher modified several of Bush's content categories 
and incorporated them into the following category system. With the aid 
of the content categories and indicants, the researcher first scanned 
the editorials and coded them. The following are the categories and 
indicants that were constructed. The * denotes those categories and 
indicants formulated by Bush. When more than one issue (category) within 
an editorial was discussed, a coding decision was made by selecting the 
one which was more dominant. 
The Significant Categories 
Draft - includes anti-draft and pro-war aspects about the war. 
*Diplomacy/Foreign Relations - includes news of diplomatic relations 
between nations (i.e., U.N. official activities of ambassadors, 
military officials, etc.). 
Vietnam Policy and Johnson's Administration - includes support or 
criticism of the Vietnam policy and the Johnson staff. 
Cease-fire - concerned with sentiments toward a conditional or uncon-
ditional bombing halt. 
Negotiation - concerned with the peace talks and a site. 
South Vietnam Should Take Full Responsibility - includes sentiments 
expressing the withdrawal of American troops, so that South Vietnam 
could assume a major fighting role. 
Escalation - concerned with sentiments toward speeding up the war. 
*Allies - foreign reaction toward the U.S.'s involvement in the war. 
Casualties and War Activities - concerned with events and the fatal 
incidences related to battlefield activity. 
Social Reform - concerned with social reform for the Vietnamese people. 
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u.s. - U.S.S.R. relations - includes sentiments regarding the relation-
ship between the U.S. and Russia. 
*Politics - includes aspects about issues, candidates and leaders on the 
national level; also includes the 1968 election as an issue 
related to the war. 
Economics - any editorial discussing the economy and the effects of the 
war. 
The unit of analysis. was the entire editorial. Each category within 
the unit of analysis was evaluated for its directional dimensions, as 
well as its overall tone. The dimensions included: 1) unfavorable/ 
pro-war (those editorials that reflected support of the Vietnam War, and 
voiced sentiments of pro-war supporters), 2) favorable/anti-war (those 
editorials which opposed the Vietnam War and America1s involvement in it, 
and expressed the support for anti-war advocates), and 3) neutral (those 
editorials which had no perceived direction). 
Questions for this Study 
The latent aspects of communication about the Vietnam War and 
America1s involvement in that war will be explored by way of asking 
questions regarding the content of the messages carried by the selected 
newspapers. In analyzing editorial attitudes, a researcher needs 
questions which are pertinent to what is being sought. Some of those. 
questions will be: 
1. What facts or oplnlons was the public told about American 
political interests in Indochina or Asia, and the consequent 
involvement in the Vietnam War? 
2. What was the nature of the news editorials? 
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3. Did coverage of the war vary in the two newspapers either in 
depth or in content? 
4. What stories about the ·war resulted in the greatest number of 
editorial comments? 
5. What would a reader without prior knowledge of Vietnam decide 
from the two newspapers' editorials concerning the strategic 
importance of Vietnam to America? 
Finding answers to the above questions may not tell us all there is 
about the coverage of the Vietnam War, but the analysis of the editorials 
will help balance the sensational reporting of the war and the news-
worthy aspects of the political controversy in Vietnam. Also, in 
undertaking such a study, we hope we will have come a step further in 
understanding this tragic event in our country's history. 
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FINDINGS "OF THE STUDY 
The findings of the study have been reported "here under the following 
rubrics: 1) the nature and pattern of the editorial opinions in the 
Washington Post and the New York Times on the Vietnam War for 1968; 
2) the direction of the opinions; 3) the overall theme of the editorials; 
and 4) an overview of the preceding three rubrics. 
Nature and Pattern of Editorials 
A total of 201 editorials from the sample of the two newspapers were 
examined for editorial opinions on the Vietnam War. The figures seem to 
imply that the New York Times (n=100) and the Washington Post (n=101) 
editorial attitudes toward the Vietnam War were distinct, and for the 
most part, clear-cut. The Times, for 1968, was consistently anti-war in 
. 
its attitudes. Interestingly enough, the Post seemed to have varied in 
its arguments both for and "against the war. The Post had almost half as 
many pro-war editorials (n=14) as it did anti-war {n=29} editorials. 
Whereas, the Times had only anti-war editorials (n=60). 
The quantitative analysis of the editorial subject matter on the 
Vietnam War under the thirteen (13) categories is indicated in Table 1. 
From the analysis, it appears that the majority of the sample daily 
newspapers' editorials dealt with 1) "Politics" (32.0%),2) the "Johnson 
Administration and the Vietnam Policl' (20.0%), 3) "Negotiation" (10.0%), 
4) "Cease-fire" (10.0%), 5) "Casualties and War Activityll (8.0%), 
6) IIDiplomacy" (6.0%), 7} "South Vietnam Should Take Full Responsibil ity" 






























































































































































































































































































































































IIU.S.-U.S.S.R.,II IIEsca1ation,1I and IIEconomics. 1I The categorical issues 
are discussed in order of the number of editorials which appeared in the 
two newspapers. 
The IIpo1itics ll category 
The majority of the editorials (n=65; 32.0%) in the two sample 
newspapers dealt with the IIP01itics ll category. The Washington Post 
carried 33 editorials, and the New York Times carried 32 editorials. 
A qualitative analysis of the editorials dealing with IIpo1itics ll 
indicates that the Post and Times expressed editorial opinion on the 
Presidential election of 1968, and the candidates' views on the Vietnam 
War. In its editorial on February 29 (p. A14), IIDebasing the Debate,1I 
the Post was extremely critical of Senator Fulbright and the war critics 
on the Foreign Relations Conmittee, calling them IIblackmailers. 1I The 
editorial conmented, IIIt is nothing less than blackmail to make the 
prospect of negotiation with an apparently intransigent enemy the price 
for passage of appropriations for the Asian Development Bank. 1I It 
further stated that it would be better lIif senatorial critics would shun 
political reprisa1s 11 and lIif the President would be more generous in his 
estimate of the motives of those who differ with him. II 
The Post was also critical of a proposal done by a group called 
the 'Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam'. Their 
proposal, IIA Balance Sheet on Bombing,1I (January 16, p. A14), was termed 
an lIunappea1ingil position for a politician. 
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While the Post did not openly endorse a candidate in any of its 
editorials, it did praise Senator Edward Kennedy's views on how the Viet-
nam situation should be handled (August 22, "Edward Kennedy on Vietnam", 
p. A20). Kennedy favored the United States unconditionally halting all 
bombing of North Vietnam. He believed the United States should commence 
negotiations with Hanoi on a mutual withdrawal of all American and North 
Vietnamese forces from the South. The editorial also shared Kennedy's 
view that the Paris talks should deal strictly with this mutual with-
drawal concept, and not with the creation of a government for South Vietnam. 
The Times questioned whether the Vietnam War had caused Johnson's 
popularity to go from a record-setting 15 million vote plurality to a 
perilous point in its January 14 editorial ("L.B.J. and 1968"). The 
editorial claimed that even though Johnson's domestic spending and reform 
policies offended the voters, such forces would pose no threat to his 
political strength were it not for Vietnam. 
The difference in editorial coverage between the two sample news-
papers under the "Politics" category concerning the Presidential candi-
dates was noteworthy. As stated before, the Post did not directly 
endorse a Presidential candidate. However, the Times was more verbose 
in its criticism of the candidates, as well as in its praise. About 
Richard Nixon, an editorial stated (February 4, liThe Persistent Suitor," 
p. 12) that his candidacy offered the nation "no genuine alternative in 
Vietnam except that of a man who is not a Democrat and is not named 
Johnson. II The editorial referred to Nixon's speech in 1954 when he told 
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the American Society of Newspaper Editors that if Communist expansion 
would be averted by "putting American boys in ... I personally would support 
such a decision." Thus, the editor believed that though Nixon now 
promised fresh ideas, his was still in "insistent courtship." 
The August 28 editorial, "Mr. Humphrey's Incubus ••.. ", criticized 
Humphrey for aligning himself with Johnson's Vietnam policy, which the 
editorial 'called a "mistaken" policy. It accused Humphrey of avoiding 
unpleasant confrontations with Johnson and of lacking independence. 
On October 2, October 6, October 11, October 12, October 13, and 
October 30, the Times ran editorials which endorsed Hubert Humphrey 
for President and Edward Muskie for Vice President. The editorial on 
October 12, page 36, claimed that the war would be more readily ended 
by Humphrey; and on October 30 (page 32), an editorial said Humphrey 
would be more likely "to lead the country" out of the "morass of Vietnam." 
The "Vietnam Policy and Johnson Administration" category 
Forty (39.9%) editorials were assigned to the "Vietnam Policy and 
Johnson Administration" category. Of that total, fifteen (14.9%) were 
found in the Post and twenty-five (25%) were in the Times. 
These categories were further broken down into subcategories of 
support and criticism of the policy and the administration, which varied 
as the months passed. For instance, in March, 1968, President Johnson 
announced that he would not seek re-election. At this same time, he 
ordered a bombing halt of North Vietnam, not to include the immediate 
vicinity of the DMZ. For these moves, he was praised by both the Post 
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and the Times. These editorials were coded under the category of support 
for the policy and administration. However, the majority of the Postls 
earlier editorials offered praise and support to the administration and 
its policy of maintaining the American position in South Vietnam, asking 
for a U.S. military victory, and questioning the wisdom of bombing 
pauses. 
Likewise, the Times' editorials tended to support the Johnson 
Administration whenever the administration re-eva1uated its policy on the 
Vietnam War. On April 2, the Times editorial, "Gesture for Peace," (p. 
46), reflecting its anti-war sentiments, praised Johnson for turning 
away from lithe futile doctrine of military escalation" for victory in 
Vietnam, and for moving towards a search for a political situation in 
which HAll South Vietnamese will playa part." The editorial agreed that 
the move not to stop bombing along the DMZ was best, so as not to place 
the American and allied troops in jeopardy. It also stated that Hanoi 
and Moscow "must realize that Johnson has gone as far as expected in this 
initial move toward peace." When Johnson ordered another bombing halt 
on October 31, a Times editorial lauded him for "allowing the world a 
future prospect for peace II ("A Step Toward Peace," November 1, p. 46). 
The "Negotiation" category 
Of the editorials found in the two sample daily newspapers, twenty-one 
(10.0%) dealt with the "Negotiation" category. Surprisingly, sixteen of 
these were found in the Post (twelve of which favored negotiation, two 
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were neutral, two were unfavorable). The remaining five were found in 
the Times, all of which favored negotiation, and expressed anti-war 
feelings. 
The first editorial on the subject of negotiation in the Times 
(January 14, liThe ~isk of Peace--and War,1I p. 16) urged that the wise 
choice for the United States and North Vietnam is a IInegotiated settlement 
which offers victory to no one, but which would give ravaged Vietnam the 
place it needs to rebuild. That is the best hope for the Vietnamese 
people an~ for the world. 1I 
The Postls editorial (March 19, IIA Vietnam Commission,1I p. A8) 
supported Robert F. Kennedyls challenge to the President to establish a 
commission which would review the Vietnam policy. The editorial agreed 
that there was a necessity for such a commission in that it might lead 
to de-escalation, negotiation and conciliation. 
The "Cease-fire" category 
Under the "Cease-fire" category, twenty (10.0%) editorials were 
carried in the two newspapers. The Washington Post carried five edi-
torials, and the New York Times carried fifteen editorials. 
All of the editorials dealt with the bombing halt issue, what 
measures should be taken to resolve the fighting, and under what 
circumstances. Of the five Post editorials, three projected anti-war 
feelings, one was neutral, and one had pro-war interests. The Times l 
editorials had eleven anti-war themes, and four strongly anti-war 
themes. 
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The IICasualties and War Activities ll category 
There were sixteen (8.0%) editorials coded under the IICasualties 
and War Activities ll category. Ten of these editorials were written in 
the Post. The remaining six were in the Times. 
A Post editorial discussing the Tonkin Gulf Incident of 1964 was 
placed under this category. In this editorial, the editorial commented 
that the country was left IIfacing dangers far more serious than those 
that confronted it in 1964, with purpose confused, confidence shaken and 
counsels divided. 1I 
A Times editorial regarding the Pueblo Incident was also coded 
under this category, as was an editorial in the Post on the death of 
Major General Keith Ware, who died in IIhostile enemy activity.1I 
The IIDiplomacy and Foreign Relations ll category 
Under this category, twelve (6.0%) editorials were covered in the 
two daily newspapers. The Washington Post carried five editorials, and 
the New York Times carried seven editorials. 
Editorials pertaining to United Nation activities, such as appoint-
ments and resignations of officials were placed in this category. The 
majority of the editorials in the two newspapers, however, discussed the 
Paris Peace Talks and the selection of a site for the talks. 
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Direction of Editorial Coverage 
and Thematic Scope 
The analysis of treatment accorded to the editorials along the three 
directional dimensions, favorable, neutral, and unfavorable is contained in 
Tables 2 and 3. 
The two sample newspapers tended to be neutral in their editorial 
opinions (89.5%). The Post had an overall total of forty-six editorials 
with neutral leanings; whereas, the Times had forty-four editorials coded 
as neutral. The Post had forty-four editorials leaning toward the 
favorable/positive dimension. The Times trailed with thirty-four 
favorable/positive editorials. For the unfavorable/negative dimension, 
the Times led with twenty-two editorials, and the Post had only eleven 
editorials. 
An explanation of the directional dimensions will be further 
explained by category. 
The "Politics" category 
On August 5, the Post's editorial, "Good Sense in Miami ," praised 
the GOP's Vietnam plank. Nixon (p. A18) was characterized as "thinking 
cool. .. on crucial points," and was lauded for his "notable ... restraint." 
In another favorable editorial (August 22, "Edward Kennedy on Vietnam," 
p. A20), the Post praised Senator Kennedy, who supported an unconditional 
bombing halt of North Vietnam, and the mutual withdrawal of all American 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4. Trend of overall tone by newspaper 
Washington Post New York Times 
Theme (n= } (%) {n= J {%} 
Strongly anti-war a 0.0 11 11 
Anti-war 29 28.7 49 49 
Neutral 57 56.4 40 40 
Pro-war 13 12.8 a a 
Strongly pro-war 2 1.98 a a 
TOTAL lOT 100.00 100 1 00 
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Twenty-six of the Postls editorials indicated neutral directional 
dimensions as well. Many of them discussed the Presidential candidates 
and their views on the war, which the Post seemed unwilling. to commit 
itself to. And indeed, it criticized Marylandls General Assembly for 
IIgetting bogged down ll in the debate on Johnsonls Vietnam policy 
(February 14, IIVietnam At Annapolis,1I p. A22). 
Of the four Post. editorials coded as being unfavorable, only one 
expressed direct anti-war feelings. The others were defending those who 
supported the Vietnam War. Such was the case with the Citizens Committee 
for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam, a group mentioned earlier. However, 
in an editorial on December 18 (IIClifford Embattled,1I p. A20), 
Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford was praised for his new-found 
evaluation and stand on the Vietnam War. Clifford maintained that Saigon 
did not want the war to end, and that Americans in Saigon were still 
hoping for a military victory. The editorial praised him for his IImore 
than usual clarity and candor ll and IIfor giving warts and all. 1I 
The New York Times had eight editorial s under the "Pol itics" 
category. All but one had anti-war themes. IIA Straw For Doves,1I on 
October 2, endorsed Hubert Humphrey as the (p. 38) Democratic Presidential 
candidate, because he lIoffered something hopeful ll for the perplexing 
Vietnam situation. And, on October 15 ("Agonizing Reappraisal," p. 46), 
the editorial complimented George Bundy, past Special Assistant for 
National Security to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who in 1965 had 
supported the war. In 1968, though, he urged the U.S. to IIdecide that 
39 
it will steadily, systematically and substantially reduce the number of 
casualties, the number of Americans in Vietnam, and the dollar cost of 
the war. 1\ 
"Mr. Humphrey's Incubus ••. " (August 28, p. 46) was the only Times 
editorial which maintained an anti-war theme. It described Humphrey as 
trying to avoid "an unpleasant ll confrontation with Johnson, and lacking 
independence. 
The "Vietnam Pol icy and Johnson's Administration" categor.Y 
In thls category, the Post seemed to give more favorable than 
unfavorable and neutral treatments to the Vietnam policy and Johnson's 
Admi n'i s tra ti on. 
There were fifteen (14.9%) editorials coded under this category 
for the Post. Eleven editorials were supportive, thus favorable, of 
the policy and the administration. Three were unfavorable, and one was 
coded as neutral. Of this breakdown, eight editorials reflected pro-war 
sentiments; two were strongly pro-war; three were anti-war; and two were 
coded as neutral. 
The positive (strongly pro-war) treatment was indicated in an 
editorial appearing January 1. It stated: 
"There are ways out of our troubles. They will be found by 
people who do not give way to hysteria, submit to sorrow or 
swoon into surrender because life refuses to conform to 
dreams of bliss. The world ahead looks like a hard world; 
but it always has been a hard world for a Nation unwilling 
to submit tamely to domination and dictation, either foreign 
or domestic." 
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The editorial went further to advise the public to "ring in the New 
Year" and not succumb to the "dreary duty of ringing down the curtain on 
the American drama." 
In another pro-war/positive editorial, the editorial spoke of the 
likelihood of the u.s. forces pursuing Vietcong forces into Cambodia. 
The administration was praised for handling the "delicate crisis" with 
great "restraint, infinite caution and tact" (January 12, "Cambodian 
Neutrality, p. A16). Still another favorable editorial reflected the 
Post's pro~war commitment. On January 20 ("Clifford to Defense," p. A10), 
an editorial discussed its satisfaction with the appointment of Clark 
Clifford as Secretary of Defense. It stated that Clifford was convinced 
of the necessity of maintaining the American position in South Vietnam, 
and criticized the "unwisdom of bombing pauses of the past." 
In regard to the U.S.S. Pueblo affair, the Post printed its second 
strongly pro-war editorial. It occurred on January 26 ("Korea and 
Vietnam," p. A20). It supported the administration's move to call up the 
reservists, although it was an "unpopular" move. It admitted that the 
capture of the Pueblo may have been coincidence, or the result of 
informal working arrangements between North Korea and North Vietnam, with 
Peking or Moscow coaching. Nevertheless, it expressed its support of the 
war in the following words: 
"Our best hope of countering this pressure while avoiding a 
wider war almost certainly lies in a demonstration of our 
willingness to wage a wider war if we must." 
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Finally, on February 3 (IITerms for A Bombing Halt," p. A12), the 
Post gave its reaction to Johnson's speech on a bombing halt. Johnson 
said, "Unless we have some sign [the enemy] will not accelerate his 
aggression if we halt the bombing, then we shall continue to give our 
American men the protection America ought to give them." The editorial 
commented that: 
"To stop the bombing without some prior evidence that the North 
Vietnamese won't take.advantage of a situation in which we are 
unilaterally foregoing an important part of our military 
pressure---this would be not only inequitable but extremely 
hazardous." 
The editorial further stated, "An opportunity for peace talks is a 
precious commodity in a situation like this." 
An anti-war attitude of the Post was indicated in an editorial on 
January 6 ("Less Than Halfway," p. Ala). It referred to the raid against 
the port of Haiphong as "poor timing" for the U.s. And, it said that 
such actions had not done much "to enhance" the administration's claim 
that it was ready "to go more than halfway in pursuit for peaceful 
settlement." In its criticaJ tone, the editorial added that "there is 
still less justification for doing anything that suggests an American 
disinclination to listen, for as long as we are actively exploring fresh 
evidence that Hanoi just may be signalling a willingness to talk." 
In commenting on the policy following the Tet Offensive, the February 
1 editorial was extremely critical ("Rational izing the Vietnam Rampage," 
p. A20). The editorial claimed that General Westmoreland's conclusion 
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that lithe enemy's well laid plan went afoul II was irrelevant to the real 
issue in Vietnam, and was not conducive to constructive debate over 
current strategy. It urged that a more selective search-and-destroy 
policy be applied; and that a greater number of troops be concentrated 
in populated areas where the enemy had demonstrated more strength. 
Though such a comment still typified the pro-war attitude of the Post, 
the underlying tone suggested great displeasure with the policy, nonethe-
less. The editorial opinion was that though these alternatives had been 
advanced "publicly and privately by responsible men, they are unlikely 
to get a full hearing while we are determined to find enemy failures in 
actions where the enemy, by its own known definition of its objectives, 
finds success." 
The Post presented its most critical editorial against the Vietnam 
policy and the administration on August 4 ("Vietnam---An Unlearned 
Lesson," p. 86). North Vietnam had slowed down its activity, and military 
strategists believed the enemy was preparing for another offensive. 
Johnson responded by toughening his terms for a bombing halt. This 
editorial, though not very critical of Johnson for failing to halt the 
bombing completely, accused the administration of being "insensitive" 
and "inconsistent." It stated, " ... the Johnson Administration has yet 
to learn a central lesson of the conflict in Vietnam: discrepancy, 
inconsistency, obscurity and scorn for public sensitivities are the 
enemies of public understanding and support for our effort in Vietnam." 
It argued that the conduct of the war was lIeverythingll and said: 
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" ... how it is explained and presented is very largely the 
determinant of public support, without which this war, more 
than most, cannot be conducted effectively. Some case can 
be made for standing firm on the bombing issue at this time; 
but no case can be made for doing so in terms so incon-
sistent with past public statements that they can only 
invite suspicion and shake public confidence. This is a 
lesson which the Administration, for no apparent reason, 
seems almost determined not to learn." 
The New York Times had no neutral editorials in the "Vietnam 
Policy and Johnson Administration" category, neither in theme nor 
direction. However, of the twenty-five editorials coded under this 
category, twenty were coded unfavorable/negative, and five were 
favorable/positive. All were anti-war in theme, with six being strongly 
anti-war, and nineteen anti-war. 
The five editorials which extended support to the administration 
and to its Vietnam pol icy, o'nly did so when the administration started 
singing tunes other than those of escalation and an American military 
victory. 
Two of the most favorable editorials praising the administration, 
but opposing the war came in April. The first, which appeared April 1 
("I Will Not Accept," p. 44) cOlT111ended Johnson on his decision not to 
accept renomination for the Presidency, and described his decision as 
"one of the most dramatic developments of modern American political 
history. II Also, it claimed that his decision to halt the bombing of 
North Vietnam must now make a move lito put the wheels in motion," which 
would "end the dreadful, cruel and ugly war---the war that nobody wants." 
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The following day, the editorial, "Gesture for Peace" (p. 46), maintained 
that Johnson had gone as far as could be expected in his initial move 
towards peace, and that he had turned away from the "futile doctrine" 
of mil itary escalation for victory in Vietnam. II 
Another anti-war editorial appeared in the Times after the deaths 
of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy. These events, the editorial 
hoped, would prompt the administration and the nation to become 
responsible. It offered the opinion that a responsible nation "can 
bring the war in Vietnam to an end, and firmly resolve that it will not 
again resort to the use of force except after mature reflection and 
debate by Congress and the publ ic." In addition, a final editorial 
praising the administration occurred on November 1 ("A Step Toward 
Peace," p. 46). It followed Johnson's demand for a complete bombing 
halt. Once again, the editorial lauded the administration for "allowing 
the world a future prospect for peace." 
The editorials with the strongly anti-war feelings commented on the 
necessity for the establishment of an independent commission to re-
examine the war, and the need to initiate peace talks. On February 8 
(p. 42), a Times editorial written after the Tet Offensive expressed 
these concerns. The editorial argued that the administration's optimism 
was "unfortunately ill-founded. II It urged that negotiated settl ement, 
seeking a political accommodation under international supervision, remain 
the alternative lito a prolonged war of attrition, a war that neither 
side can win." 
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Such urgency for a move towards peace was once again expressed in 
the editorial on February 14, "Another Emergency Esca1ation," p. 46. 
liThe best way to insure the safety of American troops, and the security 
of national interests," it said, "is to concentrate on the initiation 
of peace talks, rather than on the endless escalation of a war neither 
side can win." Furthermore, it described the administration's policies 
as having, "brought the nation and its armed forces to the current 
perilous position. II And, it feared that for lIinsurance purposes" the 
American troop level would be raised beyond the 525,OOO-men limit. 
IIEsca1ation, U Thant Sty1e ll (February 28, p. 46), another Times 
editorial, said that-the policy of military escalation IIhas reduced to 
a shambles Americans' hopes for ensuring a free and secure Vietnam." 
The editorial stated that Thant's reassurance that a bombing halt would 
lead to "productive talks," and that American forces below the 
Demilitarized Zone would be dealt with in "good faith ll should be put to 
the test. It indicated that the risks involved lI are far 1ess" than the 
dangers of plunging deeper into "an unlimited and unproductive war.1I 
The Times' attitude about a commission to re-examine the Vietnam 
War was expressed on March 19 ("Commission on Vietnam," p. 46), as was 
its disillusionment with the administration's policy. 
lilt is evident that something is fundamentally wrong with both 
the Administration's assessment of the Vietnam problem and 
the strategy adopted to deal with it. More of the "same ll in 
terms of method is unlikely to bring anything other in results 
than more of the same .... The man-made disaster in Vietnam cries 
out for new and independent evaluation." 
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Anti-war feelings were reflected in other Times' editorials as well. 
One editorial commented on Johnson's State of the Union Message (January 
19, p. 46), in which the President stated that the U.S. "will persevere" 
in its determination lito block aggression, II while expressing the desire 
to open negotiations with Hanoi. The editorial maintained that lias long 
as the Administration persists in this over-simplified view of a complex 
war, there can be little hope for a settlement short of surrender by the 
other side." The editor believed that Johnson's message clearly reflected 
that lithe huge American involvement in one tiny corner of Southeast Asia 
has taken precedence over every aspect of American po1icy ... and the very 
thought processes of Administration and Government." 
An editorial on January 25 (p. 36) revealed the Times' suspicion 
and distrust of the administration. The editorial accused the Johnson 
Administration of actually planning the August, 1964, air attacks against 
North Vietnam in early July. It maintained that until this time, outside 
aid to both sides had been restricted mainly to arms and training for a 
civil war. However, after the attacks, regular North Vietnamese regiments 
were sent south to join the guerrilla war. The editorial argued that the 
country is entitled to have maximum information, both on current policy 
and past events. It added, liThe United States will never extricate 
itself with honor from its Vietnam involvement unless it achieves a 
better comprehension of how it became entrapped." 
Such criticism of the administration and the Vietnam policy became 
even more harsh following the Tet Offensive. Some American officials' 
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assessments of the enemy's Tet Offensive were that it was a "one-shot" 
effort, a "psychological gambit,1I a "diversionary tactic," and anticipated 
"fireworks. II However, the Times assessed that it was far more serious 
(February 2, "More Than A Diversion,1I p. 34). Unlike the Post, it 
assessed the Tet as a "Communist victory," and as "indicative of the 
weakness of the political structure on which the American military effort 
in Vietnam is based, and threatens to compound that weakness." It warned 
that to underestimate this threat would be "utter folly." 
Another editorial, which expressed the Times' anti-war feelings, 
appeared on February 25 (IIEscalation--To What End?", p. 12). It said 
the administration's policy "has mired this country even deeper in a land 
,-
war in Asia." The excerpt below addresses this sentiment further: 
"The time has come for Americans and their leaders to recognize 
that the policy itself is illogical; that it entraps the U.S. 
in a war without visible limits, despite all official optimism; 
that it will continue to make insatiable demands on American 
manpower, resources and energy far beyond the worth of any 
conceivable gains. The only sound policy is to move from the 
battlefield to the negotiating table with fullest speed. 1I 
Months later, this anti-war feeling had not lessened. On the day the 
Democratic Convention was held in Chicago, an editorial commented on 
the "futilityll of the United States' adventure in Southeast Asia. The 
editorial said: 
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"After years of relative indifference to the Vietnam War, 
suddenly in the last few months, vast numbers of American 
people have begun to understand the utter futility and 
misdirection of this adventure in Southeast Asia and are 
turning their wrath on the political leadership that has 
dug the United States constantly deeper into the morass at 
fearful cost in lives, resources and reputation." 
The "Negotiation" category 
Sixteen Post editorials were categorized under the "Negotiation" 
category. Twelve of them expressed favorable directions. Two Post 
editorials were neutral in their directional dimension, and two were 
unfavorable. In expressions of theme, the percentages were the same. 
There were no editorials which had strongly anti-war or strongly pro-
war feelings. Twelve, however, expressed anti-war views, two were 
neutral, and two were pro-war. The Times had fewer editorials on the 
negotiations, but all were favorable towards the subject, with one being 
strongly anti-war, and the remaining four being anti-war. 
A Times editorial focused on the urgency for Hanoi and the United 
States to come to some sort of settlement. This particular editorial, 
"Bloody Path To Peace" (February 1, p. 36), cOJTD11ented that the Tet 
Offensive offered "further painful proof of the limitations of American 
power in Asia." Captured documents led American military officials to 
believe that the COJTD11unists were attempting one last massive attempt to 
improve their bargaining position by heavily concentrating men and arms 
along the Demilitarized Zone. However, the editorial claimed their aim 
"is a bloody path to peace," and hoped that with American superior power, 
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and ·if Washington1s trend in its flexible diplomacy persisted, then steps 
toward negotiation co~ld follow. 
The strongly anti-war editorial, referred to earlier in this 
chapter (January 14, "The Risk of Peace--and War, p. 16), corronented on the 
reports of heavy fighting and of increased North Vietnamese troop movement 
to the South. The editor wrote that this alone made it clear that the 
enemy lIis not on the ropes., II as administrative official s suggested. The 
editorial expressed apprehension that should such trends continue, the 
war would spillover South Vietnam borders--in spite of U.S. Ambassador 
Chester Bowles· talks with Cambodian Prince Sihanouk. Another fear was 
that air incidents increased the danger of confrontation with Russia and 
China. Negotiated settlement was quickly recorronended as the IIbest hope 
for the Vietnamese people and for the world. 1I 
When Hanoi agreed to peace talks, this was viewed as both a tre-
mendous and tiny step by the Post (April 4, IIA Tremendous Tiny Step, II 
p. A20). The step was considered small because it forced policy makers 
to review their confidence that the country would gain a decisive 
advantage by intensified fighting. The Post considered Hanoi·s move 
IIbigll because it believed that the Tet Offensive, in ~pite of the damage 
it did, demonstrated the limitations of the enemy. 
The Post expressed its pro-war sentiments, and negative feelings 
about negotiation talks in an editorial headed IIFrom ·Would· To ·Wi1l· 11 
(January 3, p. A16). The Post stated that it saw no II serious purpose ll 
in sitting down to negotiate until both sides were ready to trust each 
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other. However, it was not pleased with the terms proposed by North 
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, and said they remained 
"unacceptable.1I Furthermore, the editorial disagreed that II we should 
drop the whole enterprise and go home. 1I 
The IISouth Vietnam Should Take Full Responsibil ityll cateqory 
The Washington Post had seven editorials coded under this category; 
all seven were favorable toward the issue, and all seven were anti-war. 
IIVietnam Mission---A Return to First Mission" (March 6, p. A22) 
argued against the need for additional American troops in Vietnam. It 
said that IIthere is the need for a more passive role for American forces 
and a more active one for the South Vietnamese. 1I The editorial expressed 
its fear that a prolonged war might constitute a greater enemy deterrent 
and a larger inducement to accept a negotiation or de facto settlement. 
It said: 
IIThere is no doubt a strong impulse to seek a quick decision 
by expanding firepower and increasing manpower; but it may 
by more effective to demonstrate our staying power and our 
sticking power." 
It further stated that greater emphasis should be put on pacification 
among the people, and less on search and destroy and on body counts. 
Another editorial (March 23, "South Vietnam's War, p. A12) 
encouraged the U.S. to support President Thieu in his efforts to make 
the war a South Vietnamese war. It said, "We must struggle to return 
the burdens and prerogatives of the war to South Vietnam's government 
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and people. 1I Also, by turning things over to Saigon, and disengaging 
itself in the war, the editorial believed this would be an IIhonorable 
discharge of our responsibil ities. 1I Another anti-war editorial spoke of 
Johnson1s decision in 1965 to deploy American troops to dissuade Hanoi 
from its campaign to take over South Vietnam by force, and his decision 
in 1968 to shift back to the original track-- II to move in a much more 
positive and forceful way toward the day when the South Vietnamese are 
carrying proportionately more of the load. 1I 
The last Post editorial regarding the subject of turning the bulk 
. --
of the responsibilities over to the South Vietnamese was written on 
November 1 (liThe Breakthrough,1I p. A22). Written after another announce-
ment by Johnson to half all American attacks on North Vietnam, it said: 
IIFor it is a fact now, as it was a fact five years ago when 
John F. Kennedy first said it, that the war is first and last 
a Vietnamese war, theirs to solve---theirs--in the last analysis---
to end. II 
Furthermore, the editorial emphasized that Americans could not expect 
an lIearly or easy disengagement. 1I 
The two Times editorials which discussed giving South Vietnam full 
responsibility for the war were neutral in direction and in theme. Both 
discussed coalition government, whereby the Saigon government and the 
Vietcong (NLF) could work out their problems. Though the Times favored 
this alternative, it expressed that to hope for such a government in 
Saigon was IImerely wishful thinking" (August 22, "Kennedy on Vietnam," 
p. 36; April 5, "Saigon l s First Talk,1I p. 46). 
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The IICease-fire ll category 
The Post editorial opinions in the IICease-fire ll category were treated 
more in the favorable (n=4) direction than in the unfavorable (n=O) or 
neutral (n=l) directions. The four favorable opinions tended to support 
the view that the war could not be won by military escalation, but 
suggested that efforts be made to come to a final agreement on a bombing 
halt. Within this same category, an editorial commented as well on 
McGeorge Bundy's charge that we should start "packing up our American 
troops,1I and consider our IImission accomplished ll without any concern for 
the consequences. Predictably, the Post disagreed with this aspect of 
Bundy's proposal (October 14, " ... And Mr. Bundy's B.1ueprint for 1969," 
p. A20). 
The Ti~e~ was more favorable toward the proposed cease-fire in its 
editorials (n=15; 14.9%) than was the 1:0st. What is more, the directional 
dimension was more pronounced. Fourteen of the fifteen editorials were 
favorable in direction. Only one was neutral. Likewise, eleven suggested 
anti-war feelings, while four appeared to be strongly anti-war. 
The strongly pro-war feelings of the Times was demonstrated in such 
editorials as the one written on January 2 ("End Of A Truce," p. 36). 
While Johnson maintained that peace in Vietnam was IIUp to the enemy," 
asserting that II we are pursuing every possible objective" toward peace, 
the editorial responded by commenting that one sure and "simple" way to 
convince the country and the world of this would be an lIunconditiona'" 
bombing halt in North Vietnam. 
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On January 5 (IiHanoi ' s Bid For Talks," p. 34), the Times editori-
alized: 
"The Administration is in fact divided. Some believe the 
political and military situations in South Vietnam can be 
strengthened by waiting and negotiating at a later date or 
even seeking a military victory. Others argue that no 
appreciable improvement that would significantly strengthen 
the American bargaining position can be expected in the 
next six or twelve months, and that there never has been 
a better time to negotiate than now. In our view, the 
time clearly has come for President Johnson to make a move 
to open talks. A halt in bombing is the way to begin.1I 
The Times was still of this opinion seven months later. It argued 
that a IIbad ll war could not produce a II victorious li peace. "To conclude 
this drama," the editorial read, "a decision to stop all bombing of the 
North, and thus test to the utmost the change of settlement now, would 
redeem much in what has proved a tragic national adventure" (August 11, 
IIFor Vietman Peace," p. 10). 
The other eleven anti-war editorials were no less emphatic in their 
appeals for a bombing halt. On August 21 (IiJohnson l s War Plank,1I p. 44). 
an editorial stated that risks must be taken in granting a bombing halt. 
It believed that the'halt will have to precede negotiation, and stressed 
the urgency for negotiation. The Times pleaded that peace could come 
quicker and lives saved if both sides would speed the process of mutual 
de-escalation (May 8, IIBloody Prelude .• q ll p. 46). 
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The IICasualties and War Activities ll category 
The Post had ten editorials in this category. Nine were neutral in 
direction, and one expressed an unfavorable direction. In regards to 
theme, all were neutral. The editorial which was unfavorable in direction, 
and neutral in theme, indicated that the mil itary '!should .not put much 
stock in the number game" when- the war is going well, so that when the 
numbers suggest an adverse turn, the American people won't be 'depressed' 
(January 15, "The Vietnam Numbers Game," p. A16). 
The editorials expressing neutral directions and themes discussed 
incidents such as when an airliner carrying American soldiers to South 
Vietnam was seized by the Russians (July 2, "Test of Good Feelings," 
p. A12). Another editorial, "Communications Failure," (April 3, p. A16), 
discussed the bombing which took place one mile away from a North Viet-
namese province capital, and 205 miles north of the DMZ. "Fort Head" 
(July 7, p. A20) dealt with reports of marijuana in the military. 
Of the Times' six editorials in the "Casualties/War Activities" 
category, four were unfavorable and two were coded neutral. The distri-
bution by theme was fifty/fifty--three were anti-war in theme and three 
were neutral. 
News. of alleged American air attacks on a Russian ship in the 
Haiphong harbor, and U.S. air attacks on roads and bridges only nine 
miles from the Chinese border caused the editor concern in its anti-war 
editorial, "Escalation vs. Negotiation ll (January 6, p. 28). 
Another editorial gave the opinions of Generals Westmoreland and 
Wheeler, who disagreed on the most effective military strategy to be 
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applied in Vietnam. Westmoreland saw the Tet Offensive as the Communists I 
last major effort to control the war before giving in. Wheeler believed 
the situation to be more serious. He said, liThe enemy retains substantial 
uncommitted resources. We must expect hard fighting to continue" (March 
1, "New Look at Vietnam Needed, II p. 36). 
The editorials coded neutral in theme discussed such issues as the 
transferral of Westmoreland to the post of Army Chief of Staff (March 23, 
"Westmorelandls Transfer," p. 30). 
The "Diplomacy and Foreign Relations" category 
The majority of the Postls editorials (n=4) were favorable toward 
the war in direction. One Post editorial was neutral. The distribution 
by theme was even more clear-cut. All of the editorials were neutral. 
The one editorial neutral in direction and theme discussed the replace-
ment of Henry Cabot Lodge for W. Averell Harriman as chief negotiator at 
the Paris talks (December 6, p. A24). 
The editorials on April 9, April 15, and May 4, which were favorable 
in direction, all discussed selecting a site for the peace talks. The 
editorial in May revealed that Paris had been selected as the site (liThe 
President On Peace," p. A16). 
The Times had a total of seven editorials assigned to the "Diplomacy 
and Foreign Relations" category. Six were neutral in direction and one 
was favorable. By theme, the distribution was fairly similar. Five of 
the editorials expressed neutral feelings and two, anti-war. 
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The editorials neutral in theme commented on the United Nations' 
23rd annual session (September 24, p. 46); the pressing business of 
finding a site for the peace talks (April 28, p. 18); and Arthur J. 
Goldberg's retirement as the U.N. representative (April 27, p. 38). 
One Times editorial, anti-war in theme, focused on the necessity 
for the establishment of the International Control Commission. This 
commission would presumably deter the abuse of Cambodian sanctuaries by 
Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops. And, so the editorial stated, 
would temporarily ease the pressure on Johnson to authorize "hot pursuit" 
(January 11, "Shadow Over Phompenh, II p. 36). The other anti-war editorial 
expressed pessimism that the Paris talks would be successful in view of 
the intensified fighting in Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh's appeal to the Vietcong 
to step up their struggle against American "aggression,1I and the movement 
of Soviet troops into Eastern Europe (May 10, liTo Paris With Hope,1I 
p. 46). 
The 1I0therli category 
Ten percent of the Washington Post and New York Times' editorial s -
were pl aced into the 1I0therli category. These incl uded IIA 11 i es, II IISocia 1 
Reform,1I IIDraft,1I IIU.S.-U.S.S.R.,II IIEscalation," and "Economics." 
In the Times, all of these categories had directions and themes which 
were neutral. There were no favorable or unfavorable directions, and no 
strongly anti-war, anti-war, strongly pro-war or pro-war themes. 
The Post, however, though mostly neutral in its directions and 
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themes, did have two favorable editorials toward the war--"Draft," and 
"Social Reform." The editorial, "The Pitfall s of Prophecy" (t1arch 27, 
p. A22), expressing anti-war feelings under the "Social Reform" category, 
stressed the need for a search for new strategies and tactics. These 
strategies and tactics, stated the Post, should "rest less on escalation 
of force levels or graduated air power against the North ... and more on 
the need for security, stability and social and political reform in 
those parts of South Vietnam where the people are." 
An Overview 
From the preceding discussion of the nature and pattern of the 
editorial opinions in the two daily newspapers' coverage of the Vietnam 
War in 1968, the direction of the opinions and their various themes, it 
appears that the majority of the editorials dealt with "Politics" (n=65; 
32.0%), "Johnson Administration and the Vietnam Policy" (n=40; 20.0%), 
"Negotiation ll (n-21; 10.0%), "Cease-fire" (n=20; 10.0%), "Casualties and 
War Activities" (n=16; 8.0%), "Diplomacy" (n=12; 6.0%), and "South 
Vietnam Takes Full Responsibility" (n=9; 4.5%) categories, while the 
remaining categories had ten percent of the editorial assignments. 
For the most part, the majority of the editorial opinions in the 
sample newspapers were treated in the favorable and neutral directions 
rather than the unfavorable direction. 
The Washington Post (n=101) had percentage distributions as follows: 
favorable (n=44; 43.5%); neutral (n=46; 45.5%); and unfavorable (n=ll; 
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10.9%). In the same light, the Times (n=lOO) had thirty-four (34%) 
editorials favorable in direction; forty-four (44%) neutral; and twenty-
two (22%) unfavorable. 
Only twenty-nine percent of the Post's editorials were anti-war in 
theme and none were strongly anti-war. In contrast, the Times expressed 
its anti-war feelings in sixty percent (60%) of its editorials. It 
carried no pro-war or strongly pro-war editorials. The remaining forty 
percent (40%) were neutral in theme. The Post carried more neutral 
(n=57) editorials than it did anti-war or pro-war. However, its fifteen 
pro-war editorials were substantial in assessing its pro-war sentiments. 
Likewise, the Times was found to be consistently anti-war in its atti-
tudes for 1968 (see Table 4). 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Vietnam War, though eight years in the past, was a pivotal event 
in our American history, and has not been yet forgotten. The soldiers 
and civilians mangled and lost, the minds twisted and damaged, the hopes 
denied and unfulfilled made a tremendous impact on the confidence of the 
people of a great nation. The realization of defeat caused feelings of 
shame and remorse. The war, the longest in which the United States had 
ever been involved, has left irreparable scars in many of our lives. 
During the war, editorial opinion became a significant point of the 
media coverage. Throughout the war, and the United States' involvement 
in Southeast Asia, the mass media cOlllT1unfcated and interpreted public 
opinion and information on the events occurring there. Because of the 
media's editorial functions, public opinion was very likely influenced. 
With this in mind, it is assumed that general public opinion would have 
been influenced by editorials in the chosen sample daily newspapers, the 
Washington Post and the New York Times. Hence, it was important to assess 
how these influential newspapers evaluated and interpreted the war in 
Vietnam. Earlier research has shown .that the mass media, in general, 
supported the war in its early stages, and opposed it as the war progressed. 
This analytical examination of the aforementioned newspapers' 
coverage of the war is a result of this author's desire to understand 
the nature of the editorial attitudes reflecting the sentiments of the 
mass public. This study was an' attempt to make an objective diagnosis 
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of the editorial coverage, in hope that the diversity of the Post and the 
Times' opinions would be better understood. 
The year 1968 marked a turning point in the course of the war. 
People and nations crossed over to new opinions and new directions. The 
high point in the military action occurred during the Lunar New Year, 
or Tet. Communist forces simultaneously and unexpectedly attacked nearly 
every city, town and major military base throughout South Vietnam. The 
American people were shocked by this attack. Led to believe that victory 
was just around the corner, the citizenry grew distressed, uncertain 
and unhappy. Such emotions erupted in mass protest, at home and abroad. 
The consequences were even graver for the Johnson Administration. The 
Tet presented a final blow to his already waning credibility; conse-
quently, on March 31,1968, President Johnson disclosed his decision not 
to seek re-election. The Tet was also instrumental in providing the U.S. 
leaders a rationale for turning around, or at least assessing further the 
consequences of getting deeper into a war that would be more costly--both 
in lives and in money. 
When the U.S. became involved in the Vietnam War in 1964, the majority 
of the country's population supported the U.S.ls war efforts. But, as the 
war gained momentum, public opinion turned against the Vietnam War. This 
The study delineates the direction and pattern of editorial opinions 
on the Vietnam War in the two sample daily newspapers. It also explains 
the differences and similarities of the aforesaid editorial opinions. In 
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addition, certain conclusions regarding the nature and pattern of the 
editorial opinions toward the Vietnam War were discussed. 
In regards to the problem questions outlined in the Methodology 
~ection, the findings indicated that the American peoples' perception of 
the Vietnam War and their knowledge of it could have been influenced by 
the editorial opinions expressed by the two newspapers. However, the 
editorials reviewed for this study expressed no real indications of the 
public's concerns (i.e., there were no editorials which directly under-
took the issue of public sentiment through polls in any of the 201 
editorials analyzed). The New York Times carried more editorials on the 
Tet than did the Hashington Post. The Post expressed its support of 
America's involvement in the war with only twenty-nine percent of its 
editorials being anti-war. The Times, however, had an even greater anti-
war commitment in sixty percent of its editorials. 
The method utilized in the study consisted of qualitative and 
quantitative content analysis. Thirteen subject categories were formulated 
to evaluate the editorials. The editorial opinions were analyzed under 
, 
the thirteen categories of "Draft," IDip10macy," "Vietnam Policy and 
Johnson's Administration," "Cease-fire," "Negotiation," "South Vietnam 
Should Take Full Responsibi1ity," "Escalation," "Allies," "Casualties and 
War Activities," "Social Reform," "U.S.-U.S.S.R.," "Politics," and "Eco-
nomics." Each category within the editorials was evaluated for favorable, 
neutral and unfavorable directional dimensions. When more than one 
category was found in any editorial, only the most dominant category was 
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cited. Themes were also used to determine the overall tone of the 
editorials. 
The findings discussed in the Findings' of the Study section suggest 
that the majority of the sample daily newspapers' editorials dealt with 
the "Politics," "Vietnam Policy and Johnson's Administration," "Negoti-
ation," "Cease-fire," "Casualties and War Activities," "South Vietnam 
Should Take Full Responsibility," and "Diplomacy" categories. The 
remaining categories constituted ten percent of the editor.ial 
assignments. Furthermore, the figures seem to infer that the New York 
Times and the Washington Post were distinct and clear-cut in the editorial 
expressions toward the war. The Times was more consist~ntly anti-war in 
nature, whereas the Post wavered between anti- and pro-war feelings. The 
Post had almost half as many pro-war editorials as it did anti-war 
editorials. The Times had no pro-war editorials. 
Because the sample number for this study was small, more ambitious 
studies are needed to document the effects of editorial opinions using 
a larger sample and expanded time frames. An analysis which would 
determine when and if the Washington Post became strongly opposed to the 
war is another possibility. A study analyzing the editorial attitudes 
in geographical, cross-sectional newspapers, covering important events, 
such as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the Tet Offensive, Nixon's Viet-
namization Program, comes to mind as another path to explore. Through 
such studies, more contributions can be made concerning the relationship 
between the editorial and the public regarding such a major event as the 
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APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY 
1964 Johnson directed a foreign policy toward Southeast Asia where 
the u.S. had, for several years, been helping South Vietnam 
defend itself against the Vietcong, who were aided by North 
Vietnam. 
u.S. aid such as military supplies and advisers were increased. 
u.S. warships patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin were allegedly 
attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Johnson ordered 
retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese torpedo-boat 
bases. 
Congress approved a resolution authorizing Itall necessary 
measures to repel any armed attacks lt against u.S. forces, and 
lito prevent further aggression. 1I 
1965 Vietcongs killed 31 Americans at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. 
Johnson sanctioned retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. 
Johnson was advised by General William Westmoreland that only a 
major commitment of American troops could save South Vietnam. 
The U.S. military strength was raised to 180,000. By 1969 it 
was 543,400. 
In the Battle of the Ia Orang Valley, the first U.S. airmobile 
unit, the First Cavalry Division, used helicopters to drive 
North Vietnamese divisions into Cambodia. 
1967 North Vietnamese buildup within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 
prompted the reinforcement of U.S. Marines in the north. 
Opposition to the Vietnam War rose as casualties mounted. 
1968 Johnson restructed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and called 
upon Hanoi to negotiate. 
May Discussion between the u.S. and North Vietnam begun at Paris. 
November All bombing on North Vietnam was stopped. 
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1969 Nixon became President. He began to upgrade the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as part of his plan to withdraw 
American units. 
Nixon begun "Vietnamization" plan to make South Vietnam 
independent. 
Ho Chi Minh died, requiring adjustments in North Vietnam leader-
ship. 
Nixon sanctioned American and South Vietnam operations to 
eliminate enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia. 
1970 Fighting spread to Cambodia. 
1971 An air raid by the ARVN on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
1972 North Vietnam attacked American ground force using twelve 









Nixon reacted by sealing the port of Haiphong and by bombing 
North Vietnam with 8-52 bombers. 
Long-stalled peace negotiations in Paris concluded a cease-
fire agreement, providing for the exchange of POWs and the 
U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. 
U.S. Congress, reflecting the tenor of the American public 
opinions, passed an amendment to an appropriation bill 
prohibiting funds for all American combat action in Southeast 
Asia. 
North Vietnamese troops remained in South Vietnam. 
North Vietnam, in violation of the cease-fire agreement, 
massed more men and supplies inside South Vietnam. 
North Vietnam launched a major attack that ended in the 
capture of Phuoc Long province. 
U.S. completed emergency airlift of embassy personnel and the 
thousands of South Vietnamese who fear Communist rule. 
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The Communists gained control of South Vietnam and also 
neighboring Cambodia, where the government surrendered to 
insurgent forces on April 16, and Laos, where the Communists 
gradually assumed control. 
Note: Taken from the Directory of American History, EL74 DS3x. 
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APPENDIX B: CODING SHEET 
(Name of newspaper) 
Date of Editorial: Page __ _ 
month day year 





__ Diplomacy and Foreign Relations 
__ Politics 
--















__ South Vietnam Should Take Full Responsibility 




__ Other placement in editorial column 
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Theme (overall tone of editorial): __ Strongly anti -war 
Anti-war 
--
Neutral 
--
--
Strongly pro-war 
Pro-war 
--
